Presently in Australia, the three classifications of CCP spies
It may be unsettling for many Australians to learn about the presence of foreign spies within their country, but it is a reality that must be acknowledged and addressed.
Commentary
The disclosure made by a former Chinese operative regarding the existence of around 1,200 spies for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) operating in Australia did not come as a surprise. It was expected for those familiar with the local Chinese community.
According to the former CCP spy, known as “Eric,” who spoke at a Defending Australia conference in Canberra, these espionage collaborators fall into different categories.
First Category: CCP Officials
The first category consists of CCP employees, particularly diplomatic officials whose activities clearly align with Beijing’s interests.
For instance, this week, the Chinese consul in New South Wales criticized 11 MPs via email for attending an event commemorating the inauguration of Taiwan’s new president, Lai Ching-Te. The content of the email raised concerns about diplomatic boundaries.
It is inappropriate for CCP diplomats to dictate the attendance of Australian MPs at events, as implied in the email.
This type of interference in Australian affairs is easily visible.
Second Category: Professional CCP Agents
An even more concerning level of interference involves ongoing activities by both recognized consular officials and other operatives within Australia.
These activities include continuous surveillance of Chinese students in universities and other academic institutions. Such actions are not exclusive to Australia but occur worldwide.
Recent reports from Germany also highlight surveillance of Chinese nationals at universities in that nation.
Additionally, employees of MPs in the UK have faced spying-related charges.
Aside from surveillance, Chinese consular officials have transported students to protests and demonstrations, indicating a level of control over their actions.
“Eric” estimated around 200 professional operatives are currently active in Australia, some directly employed by the Beijing regime and others by provincial governments, operating under various covers including business roles.
Third Category: Spies in the Diaspora Community
Another surveillance level involves pro-Beijing members within the Australian Chinese diaspora community. As a Parliament member representing an electorate with a significant Chinese population, I often heard claims about CCP agents operating locally.
One noteworthy incident was the conviction of a diaspora member trying to influence a federal MP illegally within the past year.
These activities, orchestrated by Beijing’s United Front Work Department and related organizations, have persisted for years.
Authors like Clive Hamilton and Mareike Olhberg have revealed the extent of CCP influence and surveillance in their books, “Silent Invasion” and “Hidden Hand.”
The United Front, as described by CCP leader Xi Jinping, plays a crucial role in the government’s functioning.
Potential for More Spies
Considering the sizable Chinese diaspora in Australia and the presence of large Chinese communities in several electorates, the discovery of only 1,200 CCP-affiliated spies is surprising.
In addition to recent claims by “Eric,” the head of Australia’s domestic security agency ASIO has raised concerns about foreign spying on multiple occasions.
While ASIO primarily focuses on domestic terrorism threats, foreign surveillance remains a significant concern that must not be underestimated.
Both these security agency interests will persist in the coming years, as the threat of foreign and domestic espionage continues.
An Ongoing Threat That Needs Confrontation
Eric’s testimony serves as a reminder of the ongoing threats Australia faces. Alongside Beijing’s escalating cyber-attacks on Western nations, including Australia, the surveillance of Australian citizens remains a significant challenge.
Awareness of the presence of foreign operatives is the first step in addressing the issue. Ensuring that our security agencies have the necessary resources to counter these activities is the subsequent crucial step.
It is imperative for the Albanese government to reinstate the heads of ASIO and ASIS as full members of the National Security Committee. Their input is vital in discussions regarding Australia’s national security and should not be neglected.
Views expressed in this article are opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
