Former CSIS Head Reveals Some MPs are Actively Involved in Foreign Interference
A group of Canadian MPs knowingly engage in actions that can be considered foreign interference, as stated by the former head of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
This assertion aligns with the findings of a group of lawmakers with security clearance on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) who, back in June, expressed concerns that some parliamentarians have been consciously collaborating with foreign actors.
David Vigneault, the former chief of CSIS, made these remarks during a private hearing with the Foreign Interference Commission in August. These statements, along with inputs from the current CSIS leadership team during the same hearing, were detailed in an unclassified summary report released by the commission recently.
Vigneault categorized MPs into three groups based on their involvement with potential foreign interference, referring to it as “wittingness.”
He noted that the first category consists of MPs who are unaware of the foreign interference threat and are surprised when approached by CSIS or presented with relevant information. Vigneault also highlighted a second category of MPs who understand the concept of foreign interference but may be uncertain about its boundaries.
‘Wittingly Assisting’
The NSICOP report from June 3 revealed that some parliamentarians had begun knowingly assisting foreign state actors shortly after their election by communicating with foreign missions, accepting funds through foreign posts, providing confidential information on colleagues, and improperly influencing other officials or parliamentary proceedings.
This report also highlighted that China ranks as the most active foreign state involved in interfering with Canada, followed closely by India.
The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) has neither confirmed nor denied ongoing investigations involving parliamentarians but acknowledges its efforts to probe a wide range of foreign interference activities in Canada.
CSIS Not Focused on MPs
In their private interactions with the commission, CSIS leadership emphasized an “intelligence gap” in determining how much MPs understand the implications of their actions as foreign interference.
CSIS’s counter-foreign interference coordinator, Bo Basler, stressed the agency’s focus on foreign actors rather than on elected officials’ awareness levels.
CSIS interim director Vanessa Lloyd reiterated this stance, stating that the agency’s primary focus is on foreign actors, not on evaluating the wittingness of MPs.
Lloyd acknowledged that while the language used in the NSICOP report might be stronger than CSIS’s original intelligence documents, the overall content remains accurate in depicting the threat of foreign interference.
CSIS interim head Lloyd also noted that the NSICOP report serves to highlight the severity of foreign interference threats and urges a public dialogue on the issue.
The summary report includes insights from Michelle Tessier, a former deputy director of operations at CSIS, who commended the comprehensive information provided in the publicly released NSICOP report and stressed the importance of national security discussions in Canada.
The Foreign Interference Commission was established in response to media reports revealing Chinese attempts to interfere in Canadian elections and society at large, with the commission expected to publish its final report by the year’s end.
Noé Chartier and Matthew Horwood contributed to this report.
