Daniel Penny Jurors Must Uphold Justice: Reject the Kangaroo Court Narrative

The jurors in the trial of Daniel Penny now face an undeniable responsibility to refuse a conviction, as this courtroom has devolved into a farce.

Judge Maxwell Wiley granted the prosecution an astonishing advantage on Friday by acquiescing to their request to withdraw the second-degree manslaughter charge, which had resulted in a jury deadlock, instructing the jury to focus solely on the lesser accusation of criminally negligent homicide.

It’s genuinely disgraceful that Manhattan District Attorney Alvin Bragg even requested such a favor, as it obliterates the last remnants of his claims regarding a desire for fairness in the justice system.

This action reveals that his real issue isn’t about prior prosecutor misconduct, but rather that they pursued the wrong targets. He is effectively gaining, and misusing, greater (and clearly unjust) authority to go after his specific targets.

Be aware: According to established New York law, district attorneys must define their charges before the trial begins; they cannot alter their strategy after discovering what the jury is inclined to support.

This legislation is designed to prevent “compromise verdicts,” where jurors may settle for a halfway decision to expedite the process, rather than achieving a true consensus on the particulars of the case and its legal implications.

Thus, Wiley’s original guidance to the jury was clear: Reach a unanimous decision on the more serious charge before deliberating on the lesser one.

Since they were unable to come to that consensus, it indicates that some jurors firmly believed Penny was guilty of manslaughter while others disagreed.

The law is unequivocal in stating this necessitates a mistrial — meaning Penny would be acquitted, but the prosecution would have the option to pursue an entirely new trial.

Instead, Bragg’s team is manipulating the system: Utilizing insights gained from prior deliberations to pursue a more limited victory.

They recognize that some jurors are likely to vote “guilty” for the lesser charge, hoping the remaining jurors will now conform with no greater charge on the table.

In essence, this constitutes a compromise verdict.

Furthermore, the judge approved this redo, asserting that the “DA’s proposal would eliminate the issue” while dismissing the defense’s objections to this evident miscarriage of justice.

This move does not remotely resolve the issue, as the jury has already been deliberating over the more serious charge and cannot possibly disregard that context, which will inevitably influence their future discussions.

If Bragg wishes the jury to only deliberate on negligent homicide, he has a responsibility to request an entirely new trial starting with that exclusive charge.

This is a risk he knowingly accepted when he filed both charges; the outcome has backfired, but he is attempting to evade the repercussions.

Essentially, Bragg aimed for a touchdown with the larger charge, hoping to settle for at least a field goal with the lesser one.

Now, he has faltered on fourth down — yet the judge has granted him an extra down in the same situation.

And without imposing any penalties on the defense.

This concession to the prosecution represents a significant violation of the defendant’s right to a fair trial; if it results in a conviction, it should be overturned on appeal.

However, the appellate courts could be as biased as this trial court: Jurors should not merely comply with this outrageous pressure, assuming everything will resolve favorably in the end. Instead, they should promptly declare that they will not convict on negligent homicide, either.

The judge should have permanently dismissed them on Friday; they must waste no time on Monday in informing him that this maneuver is unacceptable.