If Our Navy Fails to Expand Its Fleet, Victory Over China Will Be Impossible

Alfred Thayer Mahan would be horrified.

The renowned 19th-century strategist and naval theorist would undoubtedly be astonished and perplexed that we have permitted the nation we are most likely to engage in a catastrophic conflict with — a classic land power, no less — to monopolize global shipbuilding.

Once an insignificant player two decades ago, China has now ascended to become the foremost shipbuilder in the world — by a significant margin.

This surge is spearheaded by the globe’s largest shipbuilding conglomerate, the China State Shipbuilding Corp.

A recent report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies reveals that this giant constructed more commercial vessels by tonnage last year than the entire American industry has since the conclusion of World War II.

If the Ming dynasty’s shift away from the sea — prohibiting ocean voyages — was a precursor to its decline, contemporary China’s supremacy in shipbuilding symbolizes its ambition to continue rising.

Conversely, we’ve taken a different path.

The US commercial sector held a mere 0.11 percent of the market in 2024.

Clearly, the capacity to swiftly construct and repair ships during wartime represents a substantial strategic asset.

This capability was a critical factor in our victory in World War II, yet we find ourselves in a precarious position, having squandered it due to misguided frugality and strategic neglect.

We are far removed from the days when Adm. Chester Nimitz could demand the USS Yorktown be repaired within three days following the Battle of the Coral Sea.

We are even more distant from the time when the United States could, by fall 1943, replace all the Allied tonnage lost in the war since 1939.

While it’s overly simplistic to claim that whoever has greater production wins a war, it serves as a useful guideline and has been a crucial element of American triumphs over the years.

The Battle of Midway, for example, was significant, but we were set to overwhelm the Japanese by production alone (we built 17 major aircraft carriers post-battle, while Japan managed just six).

This is why we ought to view the poor condition of American shipbuilding as a national-security emergency — certainly, if we face a major conflict with China in the coming years, this will be one contributing factor.

President Donald Trump is reportedly fixated on addressing this issue — sending pictures of corroded US hulls to his Navy secretary nominee at all hours — and is preparing an executive order to tackle the shortfalls in US shipbuilding.

The specifics will be significant, but this should be prioritized at a national level.

Deliveries of naval vessels are running up to three years behind schedule.

Repairs are routinely postponed, and cost overruns have become commonplace.

We lack sufficient labor.

We have insufficient dry docks.

We do not possess enough vendors.

Shipyards depend on unpredictable congressional appropriations, which complicates long-term planning, especially as the Navy introduces further uncertainty with evolving ship designs.

The decline in US shipbuilding is “overdetermined,” as social scientists might say.

During recent congressional testimony, Brett Seidle, acting assistant secretary of the Navy for research, development, and acquisition, noted that the obstacles “include the atrophy of our manufacturing industrial base, pre-COVID contracts, shortages in the workforce due to macroeconomic and demographic trends, reduced workforce proficiency, supply chain disruptions, changing technical requirements, immature designs, and inconsistent industry investment across the shipbuilding sector.”

Rehabilitation will not be easy.

To begin, we need to allocate more funds — Seth Cropsey, president of the Yorktown Institute, believes that achieving this goal will require a Navy budget approximately 50% higher than currently planned.

Any initiative must involve collaboration with allies — urging them to enhance our capabilities and utilizing allied shipbuilders in nations like South Korea and Japan for building and maintenance needs.

If we are neglecting Alfred Mahan, he is certainly a major influence on China.

Hopefully, the Trump directive will, at the very least, signal a sense of urgency.

We should act as though our national power depends on it — because it genuinely does.

Twitter: @RichLowry