Trump 2.0 Takes Cues from Richard Nixon, but the 37th President’s Strategy Comes with Significant Risks
You have achieved a remarkable political resurgence. Your skepticism towards the Washington establishment runs deep. You carry a strong disdain for liberal elites and the media they control, particularly television networks and The New York Times.
Your focus is on extracting America from a conflict you didn’t initiate, viewing it as a drain on the nation’s resources. Recently, you’ve delivered a significant jolt to your allies, encouraging them to lessen their dependence on the US for security. Additionally, you aim to counter their competitive edge in US manufacturing. Your overarching goal is to foster peace in the Middle East, bridging divides between Israel and other nations. You are also striving to create a rift between Russia and China, seeking to leverage it for strategic gains.
Congratulations, Donald Trump: you represent a version of Richard Nixon’s comeback. Since his forced resignation in disgrace in August 1974, few presidents have tried to mirror Nixon. However, you are treading that path, and in many aspects, your instinct is accurate. Yet, be cautious—there’s a reason Nixon is not warmly remembered today, except perhaps by you.
A number of my European friends are taken aback by recent events, feeling much like the US allies did on the evening of Sunday, Aug. 15, 1971, following Nixon’s televised announcement of a 10% import surcharge, a temporary halt on converting the dollar to gold, and a 90-day freeze on wages and prices.
The “Nixon Shock” was a countermeasure to a gold rush by European dollar holders amid rising US inflation. However, it had geopolitical repercussions as well. Nixon’s announcement a month prior, on July 15, about his upcoming visit to Communist China, sent shockwaves through nations like Japan and Taiwan, comparable to the dollar devaluation that followed shortly after.
The Trump Shock
The events since February 18 have ushered in what can be termed the Trump Shock. It commenced with Trump attributing responsibility for the war in Ukraine to President Volodymyr Zelensky, labeling him a dictator. Ten days later, during a meeting in the Oval Office, Trump and Vice President J.D. Vance chastised Zelensky for his perceived ingratitude, politely showing him the exit. On March 4, Trump proceeded to “pause” military assistance to Ukraine while simultaneously enacting a 25% tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico.
This has left American allies, particularly in Europe, in disbelief, with incoming German Chancellor Friedrich Merz using notably strong rhetoric condemning Trump, advocating for “genuine independence from the USA.”
There is significant confusion among Europeans regarding the US-Ukraine minerals deal, why it wasn’t finalized last week, and why Trump is seemingly leaving Zelensky unsupported. However, Europeans now recognize that they bear the responsibility for their own defense. The era of relying on Uncle Sam’s nuclear umbrella has officially concluded. In that sense, Trump’s shock tactics have proven effective.
The perplexity among Europeans stems from their belief that Trump aspires to global dominance, whereas a critical aspect of Trump’s Ukraine strategy might stem from an acute awareness of US vulnerability.
One interpretation is that Trump and his closest advisors comprehend the fragility of the US position: fiscal overstretch, given that spending on interest is surpassing defense expenditures, and a military undersupply, considering the erosion of the defense industrial base.
Notice the language Vance employed while rebuking me for my critique of the president’s Ukraine strategy on X two weeks ago: “Is [Niall] aware of the reality on the ground, of the numerical advantage of the Russians, of the depleted stock of the Europeans or their even more depleted industrial base?” Consider Elon Musk’s recent online exchange with Ray Dalio regarding the scale of Chinese manufacturing in comparison to the US and its allies.
Europeans are fixated on Russia and Ukraine. However, it appears that the Trump administration is more attuned to the issues posed by China. “I can tell you this,” President Trump remarked last week. “I have a fantastic relationship with President Xi. I’ve maintained that relationship. We encourage them to come in and invest. . . . The relationship we will have with China will be extremely positive.” As noted by Harvard’s Graham Allison, Trump has been somewhat accommodating to China, despite imposing tariffs and tightening technology restrictions.
What does Trump’s eagerness to engage with Beijing remind you of? A growing number of commentators are recognizing the Nixon-like elements in Trump’s strategy. Nadia Schadlow, a significant figure in the National Security Council during Trump’s first term, has commented on how Nixon too valued “more responsible participation by our overseas allies” in their own defense and grounded his foreign policy on the balance of power. In The New York Times, Ross Douthat highlighted Trump’s alignment with Nixon’s foreign policy realism. Former Greek Finance Minister Yanis Varoufakis believes we might be approaching a new iteration of the Nixon Shock, this time through dollar devaluation.
Prominent in Washington is the idea that Trump is attempting (as per Edward Luttwak) a “reverse-Nixon maneuver” to “pry Putin away from Beijing.” While Nixon ventured to China to exploit the Sino-Soviet split, “Trump has identified [an] opportunity, realizing that in Putin’s drive for a favorable resolution in Ukraine, there lies the chance to disentangle him from Beijing.” Russell Berman and Kiron Skinner, both of whom served in Trump’s first administration, echoed this view in the American Spectator.
‘You are a great man’
There’s also a domestic dimension to the Trump-Nixon comparison. “He who saves his Nation does not transgress any Law,” Trump recently posted on Truth Social. This phrase is often credited to Napoleon. However, Nixon famously told David Frost during a 1977 interview, “When the president does it, that implies it is not illegal.”
Trump and Nixon share a long history. “I consider you one of the great men in this country, and it was a privilege to spend an evening with you,” Trump wrote to the former president in June 1982. They maintained a consistent correspondence during Nixon’s later years. In December 1987, Nixon mentioned that his wife Pat had seen Trump on Phil Donahue’s talk show. “As you can imagine,” he wrote, “she is well-versed in politics and predicts that whenever you choose to run for office, you will emerge victorious!”
“You are a great man,” Trump expressed to Nixon on the occasion of his 80th birthday in 1993. “Your legacy earns my utmost respect and admiration. I am proud to know you.”
Moreover, Trump’s career trajectory has often echoed Nixon’s, not least through his impeachment inquiries during his first term and his astonishing political revival last year, akin to Nixon’s resurgence in 1968. Harvard law professor Jack Goldsmith recently remarked to The New Yorker that much of what the second Trump administration is pursuing appears aimed at reclaiming the executive branch’s powers to their 1972 zenith, when Nixon (depicted on the right) was at his most influential. The topic of “impoundment” — the president’s authority to withhold funds appropriated by Congress — was one Nixon raised, only to have Congress counter it in 1974.
The inherent risk in emulating Nixon is evident. The outcome was not favorable. As the system of fixed exchange rates deteriorated, the dollar fell. The Yom Kippur War in 1973 preceded a sharp increase in oil prices by Arab OPEC countries—an economic shock administered rather than initiated by the US government. By the time Nixon resigned amid the Watergate scandal on Aug. 8, 1974, the US economy was in recession, unemployment was soaring, and inflation reached 11%. The S&P 500 dropped 46% from its peak after Nixon’s sweeping victory in November 1972 to its lowest point in September 1974.
However, the most significant challenge for President Trump is that executing a Nixonian grand strategy is more complex than it may appear. I view the likelihood of a Sino-Russian split as quite low while Xi and Putin dominate in their respective capitals. After all, Nixon did not single-handedly engineer the Sino-Soviet split—it was already brewing toward border conflicts prior to his presidency.
Pacific war games
As Sergey Radchenko illustrates in his exceptional book “To Run the World,” the two major communist regimes cultivated a profound animosity toward one another during the 1960s, leading to a Cold War mindset that positioned them more in competition with each other than against the US.
Moreover, it’s hardly an appealing comparison if Ukraine devolves into Trump’s (or perhaps Vance’s) South Vietnam, as suggested by William McGurn.
Nixon had no misconceptions about the other parties involved in the triangle. He was fully aware of the Soviet and “Chicom” realities. In contrast, Trump sometimes seems overly trusting of his Russian counterpart, and he might underestimate Xi’s resistance to his overtures. Should China take military action against Taiwan during Trump’s presidency, potentially through quarantine, what exactly would his response be?
The ramifications of a maritime confrontation over Taiwan are genuinely alarming. In many publicly known war games conducted in recent years, the US has faced significant challenges in achieving victory over China. In one simulation last year, organized by the Center for International and Strategic Studies, the US exhausted its supply of long-range anti-ship missiles “within the first week of the conflict.” Such a scenario would have been unimaginable during Nixon’s era of superpower confrontations.
I would have preferred Trump to channel more of Reagan than Nixon in his foreign policy approach during this second term. Nonetheless, I recognize the president’s assertion that, much like in the early 1970s, the limits of American power are significant today. The challenge lies in adopting elements of Richard Nixon’s strategy—without ultimately facing repercussions.
