US Needs to Take a Firm Stance on Russia and China’s Submarine Cable Sabotage

Russia and China are unafraid to engage in underhanded tactics to gain an edge over the United States, and their latest move targets subsea cables that facilitate the majority of internet traffic, phone communications, and trillions of dollars in financial transactions daily for us and our allies.

In recent months, both Moscow and Beijing have escalated their assaults on undersea infrastructure, aiming to disrupt and intimidate the West, prompting the U.S. and its allies to take measures to safeguard these essential connections, as reported by intensified efforts.

Recognizing a long-standing conflict with the U.S. but aware of America’s military and economic strength, Russia and China have turned to more covert methods to undermine Washington’s influence.

Instead of engaging us militarily, they are implementing “grey zone” strategies that focus on damaging critical infrastructure to induce societal chaos and diminish readiness without inciting severe retaliation.

The consequences of these actions are already evident.

This week, Taiwan’s Coast Guard reported that an undersea fiber-optic cable connecting Taiwan to its outer islands had been cut, allegedly by a vessel manned by Chinese nationals funded by Chinese investments.

This incident is not unique; in February 2024, a Chinese fishing vessel dropped anchors onto two undersea cables linking Taiwan to its nearby island of Matsu.

Additionally, U.S. officials cautioned in May that Chinese repair ships or advanced uncrewed underwater vehicles might also be interfering with undersea cables.

Russia has also been a key suspect in similar sabotage activities closer to home. Faced with NATO’s military capabilities, Moscow has adopted more discreet tactics to disrupt European security without triggering a robust response.

In December, a vessel from the Russian “shadow fleet,” which evades Western sanctions, reportedly dragged its anchor over one power cable and four communications cables connecting Finland, Estonia, and Germany beneath the Baltic Sea, severing them.

To address this escalating undersea threat, the United States and its allies must enhance resilience in subsea cable infrastructure—a project that is long overdue.

Washington can initiate this process by streamlining the red tape that hinders undersea projects.

Currently, five federal agencies oversee subsea cables: the Federal Trade Commission, the Justice Department, the Army Corps of Engineers, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, apart from various state and local agencies.

Consequently, the average licensing process in the U.S. spans two years, significantly limiting efforts to create redundant systems.

The federal government must also collaborate with the private sector on efficient methods to repair and recover damaged cables—an essential capability during a crisis.

Currently, cable repairs take weeks or months, rather than days.

Bureaucracy plays a part in this delay, but the global subsea cable supply chain poses a larger challenge.

Efficient repair requires secure and diverse supply chains to acquire specialized components and tools.

Moreover, the navies and coast guards of allied and partner nations in both Asia and Europe must intensify patrols in cable zones and confront adversarial vessels, as Moscow and Beijing continue to adopt this destructive approach.

In 2023, the United States initiated the Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience with Japan, Australia, and India to fortify submarine cable systems in the Indo-Pacific and counter China’s security threats. The Trump administration should work to maintain and enhance this initiative.

NATO has also taken crucial steps to bolster deterrence in the Baltic and North Seas by ramping up air and naval patrols and exercises in light of Russian military activities at underwater depths of 20,000 feet.

The alliance has assigned its Joint Force Command Norfolk to monitor undersea threats and safeguard subsea infrastructure, and last year established a Maritime Centre for the Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure in the UK.

Our national security is tied to the interconnected critical infrastructure found deep underwater.

The Trump administration must launch a thorough, strategic, and well-funded initiative to protect and expand this vital network.

Failing to do so risks allowing Russian and Chinese sabotage to dominate the seabed.

Jack Burnham is a research analyst at the China Program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.