How a U.S. Iron Dome Could Transform Global Nuclear Dynamics

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency is actively seeking advanced missile defense technologies following President Donald Trump’s signing of a new executive order, which advocates for an “Iron Dome for America.”

Furthermore, Trump has instructed military officials to brainstorm strategies to intercept threats even before they are launched.

Both countries have made strides in developing offensive strategic weapon technologies, thereby challenging the U.S. military’s readiness.

While the executive order outlines various new missile defense capabilities, a key element emphasizes reviewing existing systems and determining their deployment efficacy in safeguarding the United States and its deployed troops and allies.

Daniel Flesch, a senior policy analyst with the Allison Center for National Security at the Heritage Foundation, characterized Trump’s directive as a comprehensive strategy that enhances the military’s existing capabilities.

“Where are the gaps, and where do we need to develop or invest?” Flesch shared with The Epoch Times.

The launch trajectory of strategic weapons such as nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is typically categorized into three key phases.

The “boost phase” marks the initial moment as a weapon expels its propellant during launch. Following the depletion of most propellant, the missile transitions to the “midcourse” phase, continuing its flight path toward its target.

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Ultimately, a ballistic missile reaches its target during the “terminal phase” after ascending to its peak height.

The U.S. Navy presently operates both land and ship-based versions of the SM-3 missile, which can intercept enemy ballistic missiles in space during their mid-course flight. Additionally, the U.S. Army possesses ground-based interceptors designed for mid-course engagements.

For terminal phase interceptions, the Navy uses ship-based SM-6 missiles, whereas the Army relies on the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system and upgraded versions of the Patriot air defense missile system.

The midcourse phase provides a broader opportunity for interception yet demands sophisticated interceptors capable of engaging ballistic missiles at significant altitudes, encompassing space.

Conversely, terminal phase interceptors operate within a narrower and high-stakes timeframe to neutralize a ballistic missile before it strikes its intended target.

The boost phase presents a favorable opportunity to eliminate a missile threat, given that the missile has limited evasion capabilities or decoy deployment options. However, it is challenging to detect launches early enough and position effective systems for interception.

After reaching its highest point, a ballistic missile embarks on its descent towards its target, entering the “terminal phase.”

In the terminal phase, the Navy employs its ship-based SM-6 missiles for interception, while the Army utilizes the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system and advanced variants of the Patriot missile system.

The midcourse phase offers the most significant opportunity for interception, necessitating advanced interceptors capable of engaging ballistic missiles at elevated altitudes and even in space.

While terminal phase interceptors require less altitude, their window for interception is narrow and fraught with risk as they attempt to halt a missile prior to its impact.

The boost phase provides a prime opportunity for intercepting missile threats as the missile is at its most vulnerable and least capable of evading interception; however, detection during this early phase poses significant challenges, as does positioning effective interception systems.

The U.S. missile defense initiative also aims to integrate new sensors for ongoing tracking of weapon trajectories throughout their flight, as envisioned by Trump’s order, which proposes a network of space-based interceptors capable of deterring threats during the boost phase.

Weapons researchers have viewed high-powered lasers as a viable option for intercepting missiles during the boost phase.

Both the United States and Israel have made advancements in utilizing lasers against drones and missiles; nevertheless, additional developments may be necessary to counter sophisticated ballistic missile threats effectively.

Trump’s executive order could potentially revitalize research efforts toward airborne laser systems designed for boost-phase interceptions, similar to the Air Force’s discontinued Boeing YAL-1 airborne laser aircraft.

A ‘Star Wars’ Revival

Trump’s vision for an Iron Dome for America draws direct inspiration from the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), a missile defense scheme initiated by President Ronald Reagan in 1983.

“President Ronald Reagan sought to establish a robust defense against nuclear attacks, leading to numerous technological advancements despite the program’s cancellation before achieving its intended outcomes,” states Trump’s order.

The SDI program indeed strived to develop non-kinetic interception techniques and space-based capabilities, which were often characterized as unrealistic fantasies by critics. This initiative was mockingly dubbed Reagan’s “Star Wars” program.

Eric Gomez, an independent analyst who previously focused on arms control and nuclear stability at the Cato Institute, highlighted that enhancing space-based sensors for tracking ballistic missiles falls within the realm of feasible technological advancements described in Trump’s order, whereas achieving space-based interceptors remains a formidable challenge.

Gomez forecasts that Trump’s order may renew interest in developing space-based interceptor technologies but expressed skepticism regarding their readiness within the next five years.

He pointed out, however, that private companies such as SpaceX have successfully demonstrated the capacity to launch extensive satellite networks into orbit.

“Historically, operational challenges hindered these technologies, and launch costs were prohibitively high,” Gomez remarked to The Epoch Times.

“Now, with firms like SpaceX lowering launch costs, the paradigm is shifting.”

SpaceX, led by Elon Musk, has enjoyed close ties to Trump recently.

Flesch also noted that space-based interception capabilities are a more visionary aspect of Trump’s order while recognizing that advancements by private companies have made launching into space more affordable in recent years.

Both Gomez and Flesch pointed out that non-kinetic interception systems, like lasers, face efficacy challenges; atmospheric conditions, such as humidity, can diminish their effectiveness over longer distances.

While an aircraft could possibly deploy a high-powered laser to intercept a missile threat as it launches, Flesch highlighted that significant aircraft are necessary to carry lasers potent enough to damage a ballistic missile, and these aircraft would need to maintain a routine presence for readiness.

During his speech on March 23, 1983, announcing the SDI initiative, Reagan candidly recognized that the technology he envisioned might take years or even decades to mature.

“We’re discussing a process that may not reach its full potential until the turn of the century,” Reagan stated at that time.

Breaking MAD

As the Soviet Union emerged as a nuclear superpower alongside the United States, nuclear deterrence strategy quickly focused on the theory of mutual assured destruction (MAD).

Essentially, the MAD framework posited that the fear of a retaliatory strike by the U.S. would discourage the Soviets from launching a nuclear attack, knowing it would guarantee their own destruction.

If the United States can effectively and consistently intercept the majority of enemy nuclear strikes, it could shift away from this deterrent model predicated on mutual vulnerability.

Even before Reagan’s SDI initiative, efforts were underway in the United States to transcend the constraints of MAD.

The Nike Zeus, the first U.S. anti-ballistic missile, underwent development in the late 1950s and early 1960s, employing a low-yield nuclear explosion aimed at providing a sufficient blast radius to destroy incoming ballistic missiles.

While missile defense systems can shield a nation from the aftermath of mutual nuclear exchanges, enhancing these defenses might also incite distrust among nuclear-capable states like Russia and China.

“Should the U.S. successfully implement a significantly superior missile defense than the Soviets, it could create an incentive for a first strike against the Soviet Union, potentially mitigating any ensuing retaliation,” Gomez explained.

The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit their missile defense capabilities via the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty established in 1972, which aimed to reduce the impetus for either side to further develop offensive capabilities in a nuclear conflict.

Gomez remarked that the ABM Treaty aimed to create a balanced defensive footing between the superpowers to alleviate the compulsion for either nation to enhance offensive nuclear capabilities.

Formulated in 1969 as part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the ABM Treaty fueled an interim accord that capped both nations’ offensive nuclear arsenals.

In December 2001, President George W. Bush issued a unilateral decision to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, asserting that it impeded the U.S. government’s ability to construct defenses against threats from rogue states and terrorists.

Gomez indicated that the dissolution of prior arms control agreements has prompted competitors to advance their offensive nuclear capabilities. Trump’s renewed emphasis on fortifying missile defense may further breed mutual suspicion between the nuclear powers.

He noted that Russia has recently showcased new offensive capabilities, including nuclear-capable torpedoes.

During a virtual address at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, on January 23, he raised this notion.

“We hope to explore avenues for denuclearization, which I believe is feasible. I can assert that President Putin shared this ambition with me. He and I discussed it amicably with China.”

“That would be an extraordinary achievement for the world,” Trump declared.

Reagan had resisted requests from Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to halt the SDI program but extended offers to share some technologies as a gesture of goodwill in the quest for denuclearization.

Although complete denuclearization was never accomplished, Reagan and Gorbachev succeeded in signing the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, committing both the U.S. and the Soviet Union to eliminate ground-based missiles within a range of 500 to 5,500 kilometers (approximately 310 to 3,420 miles).

If the current administration aims to foster arms reduction discussions, Flesch asserts that Trump’s missile defense order could contribute to such efforts.

Gomez also suggests that Trump’s executive order concerning missile defense could facilitate additional arms control dialogues but expresses skepticism regarding the viability of a trilateral deal encompassing the U.S., Russia, and China.

He indicates that China will likely seek to increase its nuclear arsenal to achieve a relative balance with Russia and the U.S. before entering any mutual arms reduction accords.

“I hold a generally pessimistic view on the prospects,” Gomez concluded.