Ethiopia’s disputed port agreement creates uncertainty in the volatile Horn of Africa

The deal is in return for international recognition for Somaliland.

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As a result, Ethiopia has been compelled to depend on the Port of Djibouti as a vital alternative due to the disruptions in accessing other crucial maritime routes.

Observers called the move “unsurprising” as it offers Ethiopia an unparalleled opportunity to access an additional port—the Port of Berbera—that would have been unattainable through any other nation.

“For Somaliland, this represents a substantial diplomatic triumph. For Somalia, this development signifies a notable setback on the diplomatic front. It accentuates the limited influence that Mogadishu holds over [the Somaliland capital] Hargeisa, underscoring the considerable autonomy of Somaliland,” he said.

Somalia claims that last week’s deal is a gross violation of its sovereignty. Somaliland insists that it has the UN-enshrined right to independence as a sovereign state. Ethiopia says the agreement isn’t at the expense of any third parties’ objective interests since it fully complies with international norms.

“Ethiopia obtains reliable access to the sea and will also be able to reconstruct its navy, thus preemptively averting the impending consequences of its landlocked status on domestic and regional stability, albeit at the expense of worsening ties with Somalia,” Mr. Korybko told The Epoch Times in an email.

For its part, Somaliland obtained its first official recognition from a U.N. member state that also importantly hosts the African Union headquarters, alongside profitable stakes in at least one Ethiopian national company together with potential security guarantees against Somalia.

“As for Somalia, it’s finally forced to face the on-the-ground diplomatic-military reality of the past 33 years that it had hitherto been reluctant to acknowledge, but the silver lining as Mogadishu sees it is that this presents an opportunity to organize a coalition of countries for containing Ethiopia,” Mr. Korybko says.

A pivotal aspect of the agreement entails Ethiopia’s formal recognition of the Republic of Somaliland as a sovereign and independent state.

Somaliland currently maintains numerous informal diplomatic relations, evidenced by its representative offices in the United States, the United Kingdom, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, and Taiwan.

Should the agreement with Ethiopia progress positively, it may pave the way for recognition from additional nations.

In a bid to preemptively avert the impending consequences of Addis Ababa’s landlocked status on domestic and regional stability, Ethiopian Prime Minister, Dr. Abiy Ahmed last year revived his country’s peaceful quest for reliable access to the sea, including a naval base.

Mr. Korybko says the combination of Ethiopia’s debt problems—which are attributable to the pandemic, its two-year-long Northern War from 2020-2022, a severe drought, and its demographic explosion—posed a political crisis that could have very “serious security implications” for the Horn of Africa.

Anticipating this, Ethiopia wanted to reach a deal for reliable and low-cost access to the sea on better terms than its presently onerous one with Djibouti and then reconstruct the Ethiopian Navy.

“Prime Minister Abiy proposed a deal last fall whereby Ethiopia would swap stakes in its national companies in exchange for commercial-military port rights.

“Regrettably, none of the universally recognized coastal states was interested due to the regional security dilemma influencing them to consider this a threat,” Mr. Korybko said, further pointing that the sequence of events leading to the signing of the MoU was “predictable and logical.”

“Somaliland was therefore the only viable partner for achieving this goal. It requested formal recognition of its independence as an additional term for providing Ethiopia with the access that it sought, thus leading to the MoU.”

Mr. Kibwana says the agreement signifies a “significant risk” for Ethiopia, warranting a period of observation to determine its ultimate impact—a potential win or loss.

He further suggests that Ethiopia might have meticulously evaluated all facets to ascertain that any potential diplomatic repercussions are outweighed by the perceived national security benefits.

“The stability of the situation hinges upon the extent to which the Somalia government and its allies are willing to go in order to obstruct the execution of the Memorandum of Understanding,” said Mr. Kibwana.

“Regarding polarization, I anticipate a surge in its intensity. A definitive demarcation has emerged, compelling the international community to make a decisive choice: either acknowledge Somaliland’s sovereignty or uphold Somalia’s claim to the territory.”

However, Kjetil Tronvoll, Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies at Oslo New University College in Norway, told The Epoch Times the deal has “no legal implications” yet given that it is not an official treaty recognizable under international law.

“It is an MoU [and] doesn’t breach international law as such. It is [still] an intention,” Mr. Tronvoll said, further adding that “If the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland had been accepted by Mogadishu, it would not be in breach of international norms. That will be the same position as Addis Ababa had in 1993 during the Eritrean referendum for independence when all recognized Eritrean sovereignty.”

Mr. Tronvoll believes the deal will help Ethiopia to fulfill its long-sought ambition of becoming a genuine regional power that will project force in the Indian Ocean and in the Red Sea.

“Ethiopia is the second biggest country in terms of population on the African continent [roughly 126 million people]; it has a high demographic growth rate; it has an expanding economy; and it is landlocked,” Tronvoll says.

“So, from the perspective of demography and economy, and also security in terms of reliable import-export routes, it is understandable that Ethiopia will control its own port and sea access.”

Mr. Korybko believes the U.N.’s lifting of its arms embargo on Somalia was a process that occurred independently of Ethiopia’s peaceful port plans, while the recent talks in Djibouti might have been agreed to by Somaliland to gauge its options.

From Hargeisa’s perspective, he explains, it made sense to see whether Somalia would negotiate a “dignified divorce”, which also gave Mogadishu the chance to offer it terms for reunification if it so wanted.

“Only after obtaining Somalia’s most up-to-date position toward the issue of Somaliland’s independence aspirations did President Muse Bihi Abdi travel to Addis to clinch the MoU with Ethiopia, which was sensible because he had then concluded that his state’s interests are best served through those means.”

He nevertheless noted the developments that preceded the MoU will understandably give rise to speculation about their deal, though that’s to be taken for granted given regional intrigue.

“As it stands, the Djibouti talks are probably too toxified by what came to pass immediately afterward for them to be resumed, though another format might be possible in time such as if the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the African Union (AU), or BRICS mediates instead.

“Regarding the lifting of the U.N. arms embargo, while this was meant to enhance Somalia’s anti-terrorist capabilities, the armed forces might redirect any such arms to enhancing conventional capabilities vis-a-vis its neighbors,” Mr. Korybko says.

He further hinted that the likely impossibility of any diplomatic resolution anytime soon—coupled with the lifting of the U.N. arms embargo—suggests that military tensions will intensify, especially since Egypt and Eritrea have interests in containing Ethiopia via Somalia by having the latter function as their proxy against it.

“That’s not to say that a conflict war is inevitable, but a hybrid one waged by Somalia and its allies against Ethiopia via informational [separatist propaganda] and non-state [rebel and terrorist] means can’t be ruled out,” Mr. Korybko says.